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Abstract
The objective of this paper is twofold. First, against the background of an existing
empirical literature on the duration of trade which has found that international trade
is often of strikingly short duration, we aim to establish whether or not EU imports
from the rest of the world also are short-lived. Second, since there is at this point
no clear commonly accepted theoretical explanation for these short trade durations,
we seek to provide a thorough empirical description and analysis of the phenomenon,
with the intention of thereby facilitating theoretical developments on the subject. We
employ a rich data set of detailed imports to the EU15 countries from 140 exporters,
covering the time period 1962-2006. Using these data, we begin by conducting a
thorough descriptive analysis of the duration of EU imports. Thereafter, we perform
a regression analysis using discrete-time duration models with proper controls for
unobserved heterogeneity. We draw the conclusion that EU imports are indeed very
short-lived – in fact, possibly more so than, for example, US imports. The median
duration of EU imports is for example merely one year, and almost 60 percent of all
spells cease during the ﬁrst year of service. Among our empirical ﬁndings are (i) that
the duration of trade remains stable across the long time period that we study; (ii)
that short trade durations are the result of at least two processes: countries shifting
between diﬀerent suppliers but continuing to import a given product, and countries
ceasing to import the product altogether; and (iii) that countries with a diversiﬁed
export structure also will tend to have more long-lived export ﬂows. In our formal
regression, we are also able to ﬁnd a set of explanatory variables that have statistically
signiﬁcant eﬀects on the probability that trade ﬂows die.
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11 Introduction
It is by now ﬁrmly established that not all country pairs trade all products all the time.
A good deal of eﬀort has been expended by trade economists in establishing the proper
method of handling these “zeros” in the trade matrix, with few now attempting to ignore
zero trade ﬂows when it comes to the traditional question of explaining volumes of trade.1
The zeros have also been interpreted in their own right, and especially the question of
what makes a trade ﬂow go from zero to positive has been scrutinized. However, while
researchers have used both country-level and ﬁrm-level data to focus on this issue of what
makes countries or ﬁrms start to trade, much less attention has been payed to the question
of what makes countries or ﬁrms stop trading. Nevertheless, this question is arguably as
important to understand, because factors causing existing trade ﬂows to die could be as
much of an impediment to long-term trade growth as factors which prevent trade from
occurring in the ﬁrst place.
The question of whether trade ﬂows survive or die is the focus of the emerging literature
on the duration of trade. Tracing its roots to the seminal papers by Besedeš and Prusa
(2006a,b), this literature uses the zeros in the trade matrix in a novel way. The time
that passes between zeros – or, in other words, the number of years that a single trade
ﬂow survives from the ﬁrst year of trade until the value of trade is again zero for this
particular product – is measured, and the length of this spell constitutes the main object
of study. The question asked is: can we identify factors which inﬂuence this duration of
trade? Technically speaking, this is the same as asking what kind of factors inﬂuence the
probability that a trade ﬂow dies in a given period of time, given that it has survived up
until that period.
The literature on the duration of trade is limited so far, but the empirical consensus
that has been formed indicates that trade is indeed very short-lived. Besedeš and Prusa
(2006a,b), for example, ﬁnd that the median duration for US imports (at the 4-digit SITC
level of aggregation) is merely two years. Nitsch (2009), using much more detailed data,
ﬁnds that the median duration of German imports is two years. In other words, the
conclusion from empirical studies so far is that most trade ﬂows do not survive for very
long.
However, as noted by several of the authors in the literature, such short trade durations
are not entirely easy to reconcile with the commonly used theories about trade. In fact, with
some possible exceptions, the trade theories that explicitly have something to say about
the dynamics of trade would generally predict that trade patterns change very slowly. Once
trade has actually begun, it should – theoretically speaking – survive for some time. This
issue will be further discussed below.
1For various approaches to this issue, see e.g. Helpman et al. (2008) or Santos Silva and Tenreyro
(2006).
2The purpose of this paper is twofold. First, we investigate empirically whether trade
between countries within the European Union (EU) and the rest of the world is as short-
lived as previous studies have found to be the case for American and German trade,
for example. Given that the EU is the major trading partner for many of the world’s
countries – including many developing countries in need of economic growth – this question
is important. Second, since there is at this point no clear, commonly accepted theoretical
explanation for these short trade durations, we attempt to provide a general solid empirical
description and analysis of the phenomenon, so as to provide theorists with improved
means of formulating a plausible theoretical framework. We work towards these aims by
employing a rich data set of detailed imports to the EU15 countries from 140 exporters,
covering the period 1962-2006. Using these data, we both perform a thorough descriptive
analysis of the duration of EU trade, and test the data in a regression analysis. In the
latter, we build on the methodological results from Hess and Persson (2010) and apply
econometrically appropriate discrete-time duration models rather than the previously used
continuous-time Cox model. As argued theoretically and shown empirically in Hess and
Persson (2010), using continuous-time methods – such as Cox models – when studying the
duration of trade introduces serious risks of drawing misleading conclusions.
Our two main contributions to the literature consist of 1) a focus on the duration of EU
trade which has not been explicitly studied before; and 2) the usage of econometrically more
appropriate discrete-time estimation methods rather than the continuous-time methods
that typically have been used to search for determinants of the duration of trade. The
nature of the data employed also gives rise to three additional contributions. First, the
extended time period allows us to draw interesting conclusions about how the duration
of trade has changed over time. Second, by comparing bilateral trade relationships with
EU countries’ aggregated imports we can illustrate that short trade durations seem to be
the result of at least two separate economic processes: countries shifting between diﬀerent
suppliers and countries ceasing to import the product altogether. Third, we can use the
exporter variation to conclude that export diversiﬁcation is connected with longer trade
durations.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 oﬀers an overview of the
relevant empirical and theoretical literature. The data and empirical strategy are outlined
in Section 3, followed by a descriptive analysis of the duration of EU imports in Section 4.
Section 5 presents the regression analysis, and Section 6 summarizes and concludes.
2 Previous Research
2.1 Empirical Papers on the Duration of Trade
The literature pertaining to the duration of trade remains quite limited. One of the ﬁrst
papers to directly ask the question “how long do trade relationships last?” is Besedeš and
3Prusa (2006a). Using data on US imports at the 7-digit (US Tariﬀ Schedule) level from 160
exporters for 1972-1988 to estimate Kaplan-Meier survival functions, their results suggest
that the duration of exports to the US is in general very short.2 The estimated survival
rate is 67 percent for the ﬁrst year, but rapidly decreasing thereafter.
Besedeš and Prusa (2006b) make use of the same US import data as Besedeš and
Prusa (2006a). Basing their investigation on the model by Rauch and Watson (2003),
they add the Rauch (1999) classiﬁcation of goods into homogeneous, reference-priced and
diﬀerentiated. Applying a Cox proportional hazards model, which – unlike the Kaplan-
Meier methodology – enables them to include explanatory variables in their analysis, they
ﬁnd that diﬀerentiated products have lower hazard rates than homogeneous goods. They
also ﬁnd that, within each product type, the larger the initial value of the trade ﬂow,
the longer the duration. Besedeš (2008) builds on this work, and investigates further the
implications of the model by Rauch and Watson (2003).
Nitsch (2009) examines the duration of German imports at the 8-digit (Combined
Nomenclature) product level, using data from Eurostat for 1995-2005. Employing a strat-
iﬁed Cox proportional hazards model, he investigates the eﬀects of numerous regressors
on the hazard rate. The conclusions are that exporter characteristics (such as GDP and
language), product characteristics (such as unit values) and market characteristics (such
as the import value, and market share) aﬀect the duration of German imports.
Besedeš and Prusa (2007) focus on the extensive and intensive margins of trade. Using
data on manufacturing exports at the 4-digit SITC (Revision 1) level from 46 countries to
181 importers for 1975-2003, they decompose export growth into three parts: establishing
trade with new partners and markets; having relationships survive or persist; and deep-
ening existing relationships.3 Estimating Kaplan-Meier survival functions for each of the
individual exporters, they ﬁnd that export duration is very brief, with the median being
1-2 years.
Brenton, Saborowski and von Uexküll (2009) look at the duration of export ﬂows at the
5-digit SITC level from 82 exporters to 53 importers over the period 1985-2005, using a
discrete-time complementary log-log model to estimate the eﬀects of various explanatory
variables on the hazard rate. Brenton, Pierola and von Uexküll (2009) use a Cox model
to estimate determinants of trade in a data set with 44 exporters and 56 importers over
a 21-year period. Fugazza and Molina (2009) use an extended version of the Cox model
where the estimation coeﬃcients are allowed to vary over duration time, and estimate
determinants of trade duration among 96 trading countries for the period 1995-2004.
Among the previous papers on the duration of country-level trade ﬂows there exist a
number of similarities. Not only do they all ﬁnd the existence of short trade durations,
2These results are largely conﬁrmed by using the 10-digit (Harmonized System) US imports from 180
exporters for 1989-2001.
3The former is regarded as aﬀecting growth at the extensive margin, while the latter two at the intensive
margin.
4but the majority also study much shorter time periods while using estimation methods
that introduce risk of biases and misleading conclusions (see Hess and Persson, 2010, for
a discussion). In addition none choose to focus on EU imports, with only a few (e.g.
Brenton, Saborowski and von Uexküll, 2009, and Fugazza and Molina, 2009) electing to
include EU15 importers among the many other countries in their sample.
2.2 Other Relevant Research
The consensus among papers looking at the duration of trade using country-level data
is that trade typically is quite short-lived: countries export for a few years, leave the
export market, and then re-enter. This empirical phenomenon is largely unexplained by
existing trade theories, which are not always good at capturing dynamics. One trade theory
that explicitly considers how trade patterns evolve over time is the product-cycle theory
(Vernon, 1966). This theory does not, however, seem to be consistent with very short
trade durations (see Besedeš and Prusa, 2006a, for a discussion). The search-cost theory
proposed by Rauch and Watson (2003) is another candidate, and it has been shown by
Besedeš and Prusa (2006b) and Besedeš (2008) to have some explanatory power. However,
the most natural setting for thinking about entry and exit in the export market may be
the literature on sunk costs. In this literature, models based on representative4 as well
as heterogeneous5 ﬁrms explain how the existence of sunk costs for exporting creates a
history-dependence in ﬁrms’ export decisions. Once a ﬁrm has paid the sunk costs for
entering the export market, such as costs associated with collecting information about
potential buyers or establishing distribution channels, it may choose to remain an exporter
even when it faces a temporary loss from exporting. The reason is that the ﬁrm then
avoids paying an additional re-entry cost if it foresees future proﬁts from exporting. The
importance of sunk costs in ﬁrms’ export decisions has been empirically veriﬁed by papers
such as Roberts and Tybout (1997) and Bernard and Jensen (2004). Hence, given that
sunk costs are indeed important, one would expect long trade durations because once ﬁrms
have entered the market, they will be prone to remain there. Likewise, if they have left
the market, they will hesitate to re-enter. However, this is not what the existing literature
on trade duration has found for, in particular, US and German trade. Here, trade ﬂows
have been found to follow a cycle whereby positive ﬂows exist for only a few years, then
fall to zero before again becoming positive. One possible explanation for these short trade
durations is that even though sunk costs are indeed important for starting exports of a
product to the ﬁrst trade partner, there may be small additional costs for exporting to
another trade partner. However, it is also important in this context to emphasize that
(discrete-time) duration models estimate the probability that a trade relationship, which
is already established, fails in a particular time interval. Hence, the eﬀects of trade costs
4See e.g. Baldwin (1988), Baldwin and Krugman (1989), and Dixit (1989).
5See e.g. Melitz (2003), Bernard et al. (2003), or Yeaple (2005).
5on the likelihood of starting a new trade relationship are not captured. Since the theory
about sunk costs is concerned with a ﬁrm’s decision of whether or not to export in a
certain period, given that the ﬁrm did or did not export in the previous period, it is
therefore not entirely straightforward to derive hypotheses about the impact of trade costs
on the likelihood that a trade relationship dies.
To summarize, we would argue that there is at this point no given theoretical model
that can fully explain the observed short trade durations. This conclusion is shared by, for
instance, Brenton, Saborowski and von Uexküll (2009). Our aim in this paper is therefore
to contribute to the building of an empirical foundation for developing such theoretical
models.
3 Data
To study the duration of exports from a broad range of exporters to the European Union,
we use mirror data from the UN Comtrade Database on imports to the EU from 1962 to
2006.6 The trade data used are at the 4-digit level, classiﬁed according to the Standard
International Trade Classiﬁcation (SITC), Revision 1. Using this relatively aggregated
4-digit data has two advantages. As noted by Besedeš and Prusa (2006b), unlike customs
product codes, according to which more disaggregated data are usually classiﬁed, products
in the SITC are not reclassiﬁed from year to year, implying that we have one less source
of censoring to worry about. Further, data at a relatively high level of aggregation will
yield more conservative estimates. In other words, if we do ﬁnd short trade spells using
relatively aggregated data, we can be more conﬁdent that this mirrors an economically
signiﬁcant phenomenon. This follows Besedeš and Prusa (2007) who use the same type of
data in their analysis.
The sample of exporters consists of all countries that at some point during the obser-
vation period exported to the EU. It is important to note, however, that two groups of
countries have been excluded from the sample. First, we exclude all EU27 countries as
exporters, since we are primarily interested in studying the duration of the EU’s trade
with the rest of the world. Second, we also exclude former Soviet republics and South East
European transition economies, because trade in these centrally planned economies was
arguably driven by political rather than economical factors. Following this, we obtain data
on EU imports from 140 exporters, covering a broad range of income levels. The sample
of exporting countries is shown in Table A.1 in the Appendix.
Our main empirical strategy is to study the duration of bilateral trade relationships. As
importing countries we consider all EU15 countries during the whole observation period
6For simplicity, we will refer to the “European Union”, though, of course, this term will not be formally
correct in some instances.
6from 1962-2006.7 By studying a longer time period than any previous paper in the litera-
ture we are able to both obtain more observations and investigate whether trade dynamics
change over time. As it has been argued by Besedeš and Prusa (2007) that the data quality
might be lower for the earlier years of our period under scrutiny, we therefore also analyze
diﬀerent sub-periods with later starting dates to ensure that our results do not depend on
the speciﬁc time period chosen. We note, however, that using mirror import data reported
by EU countries will very likely lead to far fewer data problems than employing export
data reported by a large range of countries (including many developing countries), as done
by Besedeš and Prusa (2007). Thus, our main strategy is to use data from the whole time
period.
For each calendar year, we observe the value of any EU country’s imports from a given
country at the 4-digit product level. For every combination of importing country, exporting
country, and traded product (hereafter referred to as a trade relationship), we calculate
the duration of trade as the number of consecutive years with non-zero imports. These
diﬀerent spells of trade constitute the core units of analysis in our empirical study. The
number of spells diﬀers from the number of trade relationships since any of the trading
parties may choose to terminate the trade relationship and revive it at a later point in
time. Henceforth, we will refer to such reoccurring trade relationships as multiple spells of
service.
In the following, we will use these data to ﬁrst perform a descriptive analysis of the
duration of EU imports, and then search for potential determinants of trade durations in
a formal regression analysis.
4 Describing the Duration of EU Imports
In our aim to explore the duration of EU trade, we start by performing a thorough de-
scriptive analysis. Table 1 oﬀers some initial summary statistics as to the length of EU
import ﬂows.
Noting ﬁrst that there is a large number of observed spells (over one million), Table 1
shows that the median duration of a spell in our benchmark data is only one year. The
most common scenario is, in other words, for an exporter to go from not exporting the
product to a particular EU country to entering the market for at most one year, only to
then leave the market again. The mean duration of slightly more than three years is also
rather low. Comparing these ﬁgures with what has been found for other countries, EU
imports appear to be at least as short-lived. For instance, Besedeš and Prusa (2006a) ﬁnd
7Since many EU15 countries join the EU after 1962, we include a dummy variable in our regressions,
that indicates for every year of a spell whether the respective importing country has already joined the
EU or not. It should be noted that, since Belgium and Luxembourg are treated as one trading block in
the statistics, we have data for 14 importers in practice.
7Table 1: Summary Statistics
Observed spell Total Fraction Total number Total number
length in years number of spells of trade of product
Mean Median of spells censored relationships codes
Benchmark data
All spells 3.30 1 1000108 0.14 364806 625
Spell deﬁnitions
Single spell 4.42 1 136996 0.19 136996 625
First spell 3.00 1 364806 0.07 364806 625
Gap-adjusted spells
1-year gap 4.21 1 756659 0.18 361161 625
2-year gap 4.86 1 641746 0.21 358374 625
3-year gap 5.36 2 572824 0.23 356328 625
Diﬀerent cut-oﬀ levels for trade
1 million USD 3.46 1 851718 0.14 335282 625
5 million USD 3.85 1 490284 0.16 249485 625
10 million USD 4.00 1 364599 0.17 203817 625
Level of product aggregation
3-digit SITC 3.60 1 490217 0.14 163995 182
2-digit SITC 3.98 1 222660 0.15 69213 61
1-digit SITC 5.11 2 51179 0.17 14199 10
a corresponding median duration of two years for US imports at the same level of data
aggregation (with a mean of over four years), and Nitsch (2009), who uses much more
detailed data, ﬁnd a median duration of 2 years for German imports. Thus, the data
suggest that EU imports are actually even more short-lived than those for other countries.
To be able to describe the trade ﬂows with more information than a mere median or
mean value will allow, we also plot a descriptive survivor function. Figure 1(a) illustrates
the distribution of EU import durations. The x-axis plots the observed spell length, and
the y-axis plots the fraction of observations whose observed spell of service exceeds a given
length. Focusing for now on the benchmark data used in the baseline estimations – as
depicted by the solid line – almost 60 percent of all spells cease during the ﬁrst year of
service. Approximately 75 percent of all trade ﬂows terminate within the ﬁrst two years,
and more than four in ﬁve trade relationships only last a maximum of three years. Less
than ten percent of all relationships survive the ﬁrst ten years. Thus, the vast majority of
8spells will only last for at most a few years, and only a small fraction can be characterized
as long-lasting. These are remarkable results when considering both the high level of
product aggregation (encompassing a total of only 625 products) and the usage of data at
the country level, which would suggest fewer movements in and out of the market, rather
than the ﬁrm level.






































































































































(d) Levels of data aggregation
Our conclusion so far is that EU imports are very short-lived. However, it could be
argued that this is merely a result of the way that trade is being measured. To conﬁrm
the robustness of the results, we investigate whether using other ways to deﬁne spells or
measure trade alters our conclusions. As illustrated in Table 1, changing the deﬁnition
of a spell only has minor eﬀects on the median and mean durations. First, we use only
single spells, i.e. observations where a speciﬁc exporter-importer-product combination has
only one single coherent period of trade. Second, we disregard all higher-order spells to see
whether the ﬁrst observed spell has diﬀerent characteristics. In both cases, even though
the number of observations is drastically reduced (implying that we have a substantial
9amount of trade ﬂows that die and then re-occur), the median duration of trade is still
only one year, and the mean values are very similar to those for the benchmark data with
multiple spells.
Third, if we use gap-adjusted spells, i.e. spells where all one-year or two-year exits from
the market are disregarded, the median spell length is still only one year, even though the
mean, of course, increases. In fact, the median does not increase to two years until we
disregard even three-year absences. Fourth, in a related analysis we investigate whether
the cut-oﬀ levels below which trade is not reported aﬀect the observed duration of trade
relationships. Trade ﬂows that are close to the cut-oﬀ level might seem to be short-lived
because they happen to fall just below the cut-oﬀ in one year – and hence are not reported –
while they are slightly larger the next year and are therefore observed in the trade statistics.
To check whether this could be an explanation for the short duration of trade, we change
the cut-oﬀ levels so that only observations with initial trade values above 1 million USD,
5 million USD, or 10 million USD are included. Interestingly, the median length of a spell
is still one year, and the means are very similar to the benchmark case.
Fifth, the level of aggregation at which trade is reported would seem to have an obvious
impact on the duration of trade. The higher the level of aggregation, the fewer exits
from the market one would expect to see. Surprisingly and very interestingly, however,
aggregating the data to the 3-, 2-, or 1-digit levels, thereby decreasing the number of
product categories, changes the statistics only to a small extent. It is rather striking that
even at the 1-digit level, where only ten product categories exist, the median duration
of imports is still only two years, while the mean is 5.1 years. In other words, contrary
to what one would expect, the level of aggregation is not very important, and even at a
highly aggregated level, trade is very short-lived. While Besedeš and Prusa (2006a) draw
the same surprising conclusion for US imports, we again note that EU trade is actually
even more short-lived as the median duration of 1-digit (SITC) imports to the US is ﬁve
or ten years (depending on the time period under study).
In Figures 1(a)-(d), we reiterate the same robustness checks by looking at the empirical
survivor functions. The most important lesson herein is that our previous conclusions still
seem to hold. EU imports remain very short-lived, and changes to the deﬁnition of spells,
measurements of trade, or the level of aggregation do not alter this conclusion.
Having conﬁrmed the robustness of the ﬁnding that EU imports are very short-lived,
we next attempt to decipher if any other interesting patterns can be found in the data.
We begin by noting that the period under study in this paper is 1962-2006, i.e. a period
of well over 40 years. Having access to such a long time period is unprecedented in the
trade duration literature, and makes it possible to see whether the duration of trade seems
to change over time. Figure 2(a) illustrates that the fractions of spells that survive the
ﬁrst and ﬁfth year of service do not really change over time but seem to ﬂuctuate around
roughly 40 and 15 percent, respectively. There are certainly many short term ﬂuctuations
10from one year to another (suggesting that it is highly advisable to control for calendar time
when running regressions), but the overall conclusion is nevertheless that the duration of
trade does not change much across decades.
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(b) Dying trade ﬂows or switching partners?
Another way to search for insights into the explanations behind the short trade durations
is to compare the descriptive statistics for bilateral trade ﬂows with those for an importer’s
aggregated trade with the rest of the world. In Figure 2(b) we plot the fraction of surviving
trade spells for both bilateral imports and data where, for every product, each importer’s
imports from the rest of the world have been aggregated.8 As Figure 2(b) illustrates, when
import ﬂows are aggregated over all exporters, slightly more than 20 percent of all spells
only last for at most one year. Using bilateral data instead, this ﬁgure increases to just over
50 percent. Correspondingly, after ten years approximately 50 percent of the aggregated
import spells have ceased compared to around 90 percent of the bilateral import spells.
Overall, these ﬁgures suggest that there are at least two processes behind the short trade
durations. First, the fact that it is not just bilateral but also aggregated import ﬂows
that die quickly implies that countries altogether stop importing many products soon after
having started. Second, the fact that bilateral import ﬂows have an even shorter duration
than aggregated import ﬂows strongly suggests that when a bilateral trade relationship
stops, the importer in many instances has simply switched suppliers rather than ceased all
imports of the product. To the best of our knowledge, the diﬀerence between these two
processes has not yet been discussed in the literature on trade durations, even though it
is potentially important because policy decisions could diﬀer substantially based on the
results.
8For this analysis to be meaningful, we must temporarily expand our sample of exporters to include all
countries (i.e also the otherwise excluded EU countries themselves and former Soviet republics and South
East European transition economies) as possible trading partners.
11Another way to make use of the information available in the data is to investigate
whether the degree of trade diversiﬁcation is correlated with the duration of trade. Fig-
ure 3 plots fractions of surviving spells at various spell lengths where the observed spells
have been divided (based on diﬀerent criteria) into three sets of roughly equal size. In
Panel (a), the observed spells have been divided according to the number of products that
the importer purchased at the international market at the beginning of the spell. Although
the diﬀerences are small, we ﬁnd that spells where the importer buys relatively few other
products at the beginning of the spell have somewhat higher fractions of survivors than
spells where the importer purchases many products. Similarly, Panel (b) shows an analysis
of an investigation into whether the number of countries that a given importer buys a
certain product from at the beginning of a spell is correlated with the duration of trade.
Here, we again ﬁnd very small diﬀerences, particularly for the ﬁrst few years. Thus, while
we know from the data that the importers diversify their imports over time both by adding
new products and by adding new suppliers, we do not ﬁnd any strong reasons to believe
that this would aﬀect the duration of trade.9
A diﬀerent pattern is found when we focus on the exporters’ trade characteristics. In
Figures 3(c) and (d), the spells are divided based on the number of exported products and
the number of export markets. Panel (c) suggests that there is indeed a connection between
the number of exported products (to any market) and the duration of trade. Export spells
where the exporting country is shipping many other products at the beginning of the
spell are much less likely to die than export spells where the exporter is shipping only a
few products. For example, about 50 percent of spells where the country exported more
than 400 products survive the ﬁrst year of service, while only about 30 percent of the
spells where the country exported less than 200 products survive.10 In addition to this,
Panel (d) illustrates a link between the number of EU markets that a given product is
exported to at the beginning of the spell and the duration of trade. Clearly, export spells
where the exporting country serves more than two other markets with the same product
at the beginning of the spell survive to a much larger extent than export spells where
9Both the importing EU countries and the exporters in the rest of the world diversify their trade quite
substantially over the studied time period, by trading new products and by entering new markets. Figures
illustrating this development over time are available upon request. While we, in the interest of brevity, have
chosen to only look at diversiﬁcation from the importers’ and the exporters’ perspective, it is important to
remember that exports (and imports) will also be diversiﬁed as soon as new trade relationships are formed.
For example, countries starting to ship an “old” product to a country with which they already trade other
products, but not this particular one, is also a type of diversiﬁcation.
10We want to make clear that we do not intend any strict causal interpretation here. It is for instance
possible that large economies export many products and at the same time have long export spells, which
would explain the pattern found in Figure 3(c). It is, on the other hand, also possible that ﬁrms in countries
that export many products have access to more information about foreign markets which could facilitate
exporting activities. The regression analysis below, where many factors can be controlled for at once, is a
better tool for testing these hypotheses.
































(a) Fraction of surviving spells depending on the
































(b) Fraction of surviving spells depending on the

































(c) Fraction of surviving spells depending on the

































(d) Fraction of surviving spells depending on the
number of export markets for a given product
the exporting country does not ship the product to any other market. For the ﬁrst year
of service the diﬀerence is very large indeed: about 30 percentage points. We therefore
conclude that from a purely descriptive perspective – at least within the data set used –
the level of diversiﬁcation in the exporter’s trade seems to be inﬂuential when it comes to
the duration of trade; while the importer’s level of trade diversiﬁcation seems to matter
much less.11
To summarize this purely descriptive analysis, we ﬁnd that EU imports are very short-
lived: the median duration of imports is merely one year. Only 40 percent of all spells
survive the ﬁrst year of service, and less than ten percent of all relationships survive the
ﬁrst ten years. Compared with what has been found for, for example, US and German
imports in the limited empirical literature, EU imports seem to be even more short-lived.
Our results are not sensitive to changing the deﬁnition of a trade spell, using higher cut-oﬀ
11This could partly be the result of the importers in our data set being a more homogeneous group of
countries when it comes to trade.
13levels for measuring trade, or even to employing diﬀerent levels of product aggregation.
In addition to these ﬁndings, we also notice several other interesting empirical patterns.
First, the duration of trade does not exhibit any long-term upward or downward trend,
but remains remarkably stable across the long time period that we study. Second, the
short trade durations which have been found in the literature are the result of at least two
processes: on the one hand countries shifting between diﬀerent suppliers but continuing to
import a given product, and on the other hand countries ceasing to import the product
altogether. Third, short trade durations are empirically correlated with a lack of export
diversiﬁcation, both in terms of the number of other products the exporter ships and the
number of import markets it serves with the given product. No clear evidence is found to
connect the level of import diversiﬁcation to trade durations.
5 Regression Analysis
5.1 Methodology
The duration of bilateral trade relationships is an emerging object of analysis in the eco-
nomics literature. In the few articles existing so far, duration times are analyzed either in
a purely descriptive manner by means of nonparametric survival estimates as proposed by
Kaplan and Meier (1958), or in a regression context using continuous-time hazard models
as proposed by Cox (1972). However, as pointed out by Hess and Persson (2010), there are
several reasons why it is inappropriate to apply the Cox model when analyzing determi-
nants of trade durations. First, the large number of short-lived trade relations combined
with the fact that trade is only observed once every year results in a sizeable fraction of
tied survival times. The Cox model faces diﬃculties in the presence of heavy ties, lead-
ing to biased coeﬃcient estimates and standard errors (see e.g. Kalbﬂeisch and Prentice,
1980, or Cox and Oakes, 1984). Second, with data sets as large as those typically found in
trade duration studies, it is very diﬃcult to properly control for unobserved heterogeneity.
Incorrectly neglecting unobserved heterogeneity (also known as frailty in the biostatistics
literature) causes spurious negative duration dependence of the estimated hazard function
as well as parameter bias (see e.g. van den Berg, 2001). Third, the Cox model imposes the
restrictive and empirically questionable assumption of proportional hazards.
As a more appropriate alternative to the Cox model, Hess and Persson (2010) proposes
the use of discrete-time duration models. Such models do not have diﬃculty in dealing with
ties. Moreover, unobserved heterogeneity can easily be controlled for, and one does not
have to assume proportional hazards, even though it is possible to do so. In addition, these
models can be estimated using conventional regression techniques for binary response panel
data (see e.g. Jenkins, 1995). While it can be shown that a stacked binary choice model
employing a complementary log-log (cloglog) link function represents the exact grouped-
duration analogue of the Cox proportional hazards model, the more familiar logit and
14probit speciﬁcations do not imply the proportional hazards assumption (see e.g. Sueyoshi,
1995). Each of these models shares the virtues of the Cox model to allow for right censoring
and a nonparametric estimation of the baseline hazard function.
By replicating an inﬂuential study by Besedeš and Prusa (2006b), but employing discrete-
time models as well as the original Cox model, Hess and Persson (2010) ﬁnd empirical sup-
port for each of the discussed arguments against the Cox model, and conclude that using
discrete-time models is a more appropriate choice. Following Hess and Persson (2010), we
therefore focus on discrete-time duration models in our empirical analysis.
5.2 Model Speciﬁcation and Estimation Results
We choose to formulate a parsimonious baseline speciﬁcation of explanatory variables which
in many ways resembles that found in other papers on the duration of trade. However,
since we, unlike, for example, Besedeš and Prusa (2006a,b) and Nitsch (2009), have both
importer and exporter variation, we are able to control for both importer and exporter
characteristics. Based on the ﬁndings in the descriptive analysis, we also include some
variables in our analysis that have not previously been used. Table A.2 in the Appendix
provides an overview of all variables and data sources.
We estimate the baseline speciﬁcation using discrete-time probit, logit, and cloglog
models, specifying the baseline hazard in the most ﬂexible possible fashion by means of
dummy variables that enable the estimation of period-speciﬁc intercepts. This, in turn,
allows for unrestricted period-speciﬁc changes in the estimated hazard rates. All left-
censored observations, which, if included, could lead to a misestimation of the hazard
rate, are excluded. Besides using diﬀerent hazard models, we present results from models
with and without frailty, i.e. with and without random eﬀects for every exporter-product
combination. The results from the estimations can be found in Table 2.
The baseline speciﬁcation of explanatory variables is discussed below. First, however,
a few words on how to choose between the presented estimation models. In general, the
coeﬃcients are similar for the various estimation procedures. To choose between models
with and without frailty, we note that the likelihood-ratio tests strongly reject the null
hypothesis of no latent heterogeneity for all model speciﬁcations. Hence, it is not surprising
that accounting for unobserved heterogeneity substantially increases the respective log-
likelihood values. The relative importance of unobserved heterogeneity for the diﬀerent
model speciﬁcations is indicated by the estimates for  given in Table 2. Somewhat loosely,
 can be interpreted as the fraction of individual variation in the hazard rate that is due
to variation in the unobserved factors. As the results in Table 2 indicate, unobserved
heterogeneity plays a signiﬁcant role in all model speciﬁcations and should thus not be
ignored. Focusing on the models with frailty, we obtain the largest log-likelihood value
from the probit model, and the smallest from the cloglog model. This is not surprising,
since the cloglog speciﬁcation imposes the restrictive assumption of proportional hazards
15Table 2: Estimation Results
Models without frailty Models with frailty
Probit Logit Cloglog Probit Logit Cloglog
Log distance  0:0077  0:0133  0:0078 0.0396 0.0593 0.0313
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Common language  0:1496  0:2545  0:1783  0:1890  0:3180  0:2163
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Colonial history  0:1001  0:1618  0:1138  0:1032  0:1699  0:1156
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Log GDP  0:2949  0:5191  0:3733  0:2858  0:5020  0:3626
(importer) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Log GDP 0.0138 0.0208 0.0110 0.0085 0.0132 0.0083
(exporter) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Exporter LDC  0:0201  0:0356  0:0277  0:0572  0:0942  0:0558
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Log number of  0:1145  0:1800  0:1129  0:2294  0:3642  0:2149
export products (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Number of  0:1042  0:1780  0:1338  0:0885  0:1531  0:1184
export markets (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Lagged duration  0:0183  0:0363  0:0334  0:0188  0:0358  0:0319
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Log initial  0:0637  0:1144  0:0861  0:0760  0:1351  0:0986
import value (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Diﬀerentiated  0:0769  0:1338  0:0899  0:1095  0:1890  0:1254
product (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Log total  0:0018  0:0008 0:0014  0:0198  0:0298  0:0155
import value (0.008) (0.485) (0.110) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
EU member  0:0465  0:0804  0:0562  0:0427  0:0757  0:0581
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
∆ log relative 0:0707 0:1185 0:0719 0:0675 0:1130 0:0679
real exchange rate (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Duration dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
Year dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
Importer dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
Spell no. dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
 0.0561 0.0473 0.0417
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Observations 2220871 2220871 2220871 2220871 2220871 2220871
Spells 692148 692148 692148 692148 692148 692148
Trade relations 265396 265396 265396 265396 265396 265396
Log likelihood  901836  901418  901037  895709  895936  896784
Note: P-values in parentheses. Models with frailty include exporter-product random eﬀects.  denotes
the fraction of the error variance that is due to variation in the unobserved individual factors. A trade
relation is deﬁned as an importer-exporter-product combination. The number of observations is given by
the total number of years with positive trade for all trade relationships.
16which we could reject for the data at hand by applying a formal test procedure proposed
by McCall (1994). In summary, as the results indicate that the probit model with frailty
best ﬁts the data at hand, we will focus on this model speciﬁcation when discussing the
estimation results.
In the trade literature, two countries with a short distance between them or which share
the same language or a joint colonial history are often expected to have lower costs for
trading. It seems reasonable to assume that, everything else being equal, higher trade
costs should make a trading relationship more vulnerable to negative shocks and increase
the likelihood of failure. Therefore we would expect distance to increase the hazard, while
a common language and a joint colonial history ought to lower the hazard. To control
for these factors we include the logarithm of the distance between the trading countries’
capitals and dummy variables that take the value of one if the two trading partners share
the same language or have a colonial relationship, and zero otherwise. Concentrating on our
preferred random-eﬀects probit model, the estimated parameters support these hypotheses:
distance has a signiﬁcantly positive coeﬃcient, while the coeﬃcients for common language
and colonial history are both signiﬁcantly negative.12 Note though that in this case, it
actually matters substantially whether or not we control for unobserved heterogeneity:
the coeﬃcient for distance is signiﬁcantly negative in all models when we do not include
random eﬀects.
Further, the importer’s GDP is included as a proxy for import demand, while the
corresponding variable is included for the exporter to control for export supply capacity.
We expect that higher import demand or export supply capacity will lower the hazard.
This hypothesis is partly supported by the results: the importer’s GDP has a signiﬁcantly
negative coeﬃcient. However, the exporter’s GDP has a positive and signiﬁcant coeﬃcient,
which would suggest that trading relationships involving economically large exporters are
more likely to die. This unexpected result is not particularly robust, though. As discussed
in Section 5.3, if we drop trade data from the 1960s (or aggregate the data), the exporter’s
GDP has a signiﬁcantly negative eﬀect on the hazard.
The level of development in the exporting country could be another factor which inﬂu-
ences the hazard of trade ﬂows dying. It is, for example, generally expected that countries
at diﬀerent development stages do not produce and export the same kinds of goods, and
the level of development is also strongly correlated with the quality of trade-promoting
institutions. To control for such eﬀects we include a dummy variable which takes the
value one if the exporter is formally recognized as a least developed country (LDC) by the
12To also establish an understanding of the size of these eﬀects, consider the common-language variable
with a coeﬃcient value of  0:189: if all other covariates are ﬁxed at their means, this value implies that
the ﬁrst-year hazard for a trade relationship between two countries with a common language is about seven
percentage points lower than the corresponding hazard for countries that do not share a common language
(38% vs. 45%).
17United Nations.13 Somewhat surprisingly, this variable has a signiﬁcantly negative coeﬃ-
cient, suggesting that LDCs’ export ﬂows are longer-lasting than export ﬂows from more
developed countries. We are not sure how to interpret this result, but note that Nitsch
(2009) ﬁnds a positive coeﬃcient for the exporter’s GDP per capita, and the interpretation
of that – namely that richer exporters would face a higher hazard – is consistent with our
negative LDC-eﬀect. This is an issue where further research is needed.
Based on our ﬁndings in the descriptive analysis, we also include controls for the number
of exported products and the number of export markets. The eﬀects of these variables are
both signiﬁcantly negative: exporting many products and/or to many export markets has
a negative eﬀect on the probability that an export spell dies. The interpretation we make
is that countries with a generally diversiﬁed export structure will stand a better chance to
export a given product for long periods of time. A possible mechanism for this eﬀect could
be that ﬁrms in countries that export many products or trade with many other countries
have access to more information about how to do business in foreign markets, which would
facilitate exporting activities. For instance, Greenaway and Kneller (2008) ﬁnd evidence
that agglomeration raises the probability of export market entry for UK manufacturing
ﬁrms, and discuss that this may be due to information or technological spillovers. If
this is the case, these spillovers may reasonably improve ﬁrms’ post-entry productivity as
well, which would imply that the existence of many other export ﬁrms would decrease the
likelihood of failure.14
Related to this, as discussed in the ﬁrm-level literature, exporting may in itself have a
positive eﬀect on ﬁrms’ performance as ﬁrms may learn by exporting.15 As past export
performance could therefore be an indicator of the level of knowledge, we include the
lagged duration, i.e. the number of years that a preceding export spell lasted, to control
for such eﬀects. This may capture learning eﬀects, but could also be an indicator of the
competitiveness of the exporter in the given sector: if past export spells have lasted for a
long time, this suggests that the current likelihood of failure is smaller. This notion ﬁnds
support in the results with longer-lasting past export spells making it less likely that the
current export spell will die.
Based on the theoretical predictions in Rauch and Watson (2003), who model developed
countries’ search for developing country suppliers, Besedeš and Prusa (2006b) ﬁnd empirical
13An alternative could be to include the level of per capita GDP, but the LDC dummy has the advantage
of being based on a broader view of development which also takes various issues connected with economic
vulnerability and human capital into account.
14Nitsch (2009) includes some similar variables when studying German imports: the number of imported
products from a given supplier and the number of countries exporting the same product to Germany. Using
our terminology, he therefore controls for import diversiﬁcation, while we – on the basis of our ﬁndings in
the descriptive analysis – control for export diversiﬁcation.
15See e.g. Clerides et al. (1998) for a discussion. Wagner (2007) and Greenaway and Kneller (2007)
oﬀer overviews of the literature, and Martins and Yang (2009) conduct a meta-analysis of more than 30
empirical studies.
18evidence that trade relationships that either start with a large initial transaction or involve
diﬀerentiated goods will have a smaller likelihood of dying. Our results conﬁrm these
ﬁndings: a dummy indicating whether or not the product is diﬀerentiated has a negative
and signiﬁcant coeﬃcient, as does the logarithm of the initial value of imports. In our set
of explanatory variables, we also include the total value of EU imports for each product
and year. The hypothesis is that a higher value of total EU imports (i.e. a larger EU
market) reduces the hazard that a given trade relationship dies. As expected, the estimated
coeﬃcient is negative and signiﬁcant.
Further, we include a dummy for EU membership to control for whether or not the im-
porter has become an EU-country. This variable has a negative and signiﬁcant coeﬃcient,
suggesting that EU membership lowers the hazard of failure. We also include the yearly
diﬀerence in (the log of) the relative real exchange rate, since exchange rate movements
could explain exits from (and entry into) the market. This variable has a signiﬁcant and
positive coeﬃcient, suggesting that an appreciation of the exporter’s currency relative to
the currencies of competing exporters, as expected, increases the likelihood of failure.
Our random eﬀects control for all unobserved heterogeneity that is constant within
exporter-product combinations. However, as this may not be the only type of unobserved
heterogeneity, we also include a large set of dummy variables. First, since we study a very
long time period, it is possible that the duration of exports to the EU varies over time
for reasons other than those we explicitly control for. We therefore include calendar year
dummies to control for all such latent factors that are common to all country pairs and
products in a given year, but vary over time. Second, we include importer dummies to
capture structural diﬀerences between importing countries. Third, since our estimation
methods assume that all spells are independent conditional on the covariates, we include
dummy variables capturing the number of previous spells for any given trade relationship.16
5.3 Robustness Analysis
As reported in Table 2, there are few qualitative diﬀerences between the results from the
probit, logit, and cloglog estimations. While the coeﬃcient for distance, as mentioned
above, changes signs when unobserved heterogeneity is controlled for, the only other vari-
able that is qualitatively aﬀected by the choice of estimation model is the total import
value. In the models without frailty, this variable is insigniﬁcant using a logit or cloglog
model. In all models which include random eﬀects, however, the variable is signiﬁcantly
negative. This suggests that the biases arising when unobserved heterogeneity is not prop-
16The economic meaning of such dummies capturing ﬁrst, second, third spells, etc. is sometimes discussed
in the literature. We want to point out that this is not really appropriate here, because even though a
speciﬁc spell may be the ﬁrst observed one in the data, there is no way of telling whether or not two
countries have traded a particular product prior to the ﬁrst year of the observation period. Thus, an
observed “ﬁrst” spell may actually be of a much higher order, rendering interpretation quite diﬃcult.
19erly controlled for (see Hess and Persson, 2010, for a discussion) are indeed an important
issue in empirical studies on the duration of trade.
Focusing henceforth on our preferred model – the probit model with random eﬀects at
the exporter-product level – we perform further robustness checks. Following the same
procedure as in the descriptive analysis above, we sequentially change the deﬁnition of a
spell and use single spells, ﬁrst spells, and gap-adjusted spells. In the latter, however, we
forego the inclusion of three-year and two-year gaps and consider only gaps of one year.
As shown in Table 3, while the former two modiﬁcations strongly reduce the number of
observations, the results are largely unaﬀected. The only exceptions are: the distance no
longer being signiﬁcant at the 1-percent level when using single spells; and the total import
value becoming insigniﬁcant in the estimation using ﬁrst spells.
Further, we try an alternative way to control for unobserved heterogeneity. A random-
eﬀects speciﬁcation assumes that the unobserved individual-speciﬁc eﬀects are uncorrelated
with the observed regressors. To make sure that our results are not overly sensitive to this
assumption, we re-estimate the benchmark data using a ﬁxed-eﬀects logit model. While
noting that this makes it impossible to estimate parameters for the diﬀerentiated-good and
the LDC variable, the results are otherwise largely unaltered. The lone exception is that
the unexpected positive coeﬃcient that we found for the exporter’s GDP in the baseline
estimations is now replaced with a signiﬁcantly negative coeﬃcient.17
Since we study an extended time period (1962-2006), we also consider the possibility
that the eﬀects of various factors on the probability that a trade relationship dies vary
considerably over time. Therefore, we successively exclude years at the beginning of the
observation period, and estimate the model for the time periods beginning in 1970, 1980,
and 1990, respectively. As displayed in Table 4, there is only one qualitative diﬀerence to
the baseline results. The unexpected positive coeﬃcient for the exporter’s GDP is replaced
by signiﬁcantly negative coeﬃcients as soon as we disregard data from the 1960s. Since it
seems reasonable to assume that the quality of GDP data could be particularly poor for
many developing countries in such an early observation period, this is a reassuring sign
of robustness. To conclude, the time period under study does not seem to matter for the
eﬀects of the explanatory variables on the hazard rate.
Lastly, we also investigate whether the level of aggregation for the trade data matters
for the results. We therefore re-estimate the model by aggregating the data at the 3-, 2-,
and 1-digit SITC levels. Consistent with what we observed in the descriptive analysis,
this has far smaller eﬀects than one would expect. As was the case when we disregarded
data from the 1960s, the exporter’s GDP again obtains the expected signiﬁcantly negative
17We have attempted a Hausman test to evaluate the appropriateness of a random-eﬀects logit model
versus a ﬁxed-eﬀects logit model. However, since the diﬀerence between the estimated covariance matrices
of the ﬁxed-eﬀects and the random-eﬀects estimates was not a positive deﬁnite matrix, we were unable to
perform the test. This outcome is fairly common in empirical applications.
20Table 3: Robustness Results: Spell Deﬁnition and Fixed Eﬀects
Single spell First spell Gap-adjusted FE logit
Log distance 0:0167 0:0098 0:0463 0:5666
(0.030) (0.006) (0.000) (0.000)
Common language  0:2522  0:1849  0:2045  0:3246
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Colonial history  0:1419  0:1022  0:1112  0:2942
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Log GDP  0:6196  0:3607  0:3110  0:4957
(importer) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Log GDP 0.0229 0.0105 0.0050  0:0472
(exporter) (0.000) (0.000) (0.008) (0.000)
Exporter LDC  0:0728  0:0370  0:0568
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Log number of  0:4152  0:1620  0:2695  0:6510
export products (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Number of  0:1721  0:1130  0:0955  0:0967
export markets (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Lagged duration  0:0129  0:0256
(0.000) (0.000)
Log initial  0:0681  0:0815  0:0524  0:1477
import value (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Diﬀerentiated  0:1857  0:0855  0:1328
product (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Log total  0:0293  0:0011  0:0335  0:1102
import value (0.000) (0.434) (0.000) (0.000)
EU member  0:0876  0:0375  0:0532  0:0830
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
∆ log relative 0:1421 0:0611 0:0639 0:1125
real exchange rate (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Duration dummies yes yes yes yes
Year dummies yes yes yes yes
Importer dummies yes yes yes yes
Spell no. dummies no no yes yes
 0.1878 0.0471 0.0672
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Observations 452787 798789 2081923 2164415
Spells 103489 265396 514313 658856
Trade relations 103489 265396 257699 238534
Log likelihood  86378  298167  725654  802601
Note: P-values in parentheses. All models include random or ﬁxed eﬀects on the exporter-product level.
Unless otherwise stated, the preferred random-eﬀects probit model is estimated.  denotes the fraction of
the error variance that is due to variation in the unobserved individual factors. A trade relation is deﬁned
as an importer-exporter-product combination. The number of observations is given by the total number
of years with positive trade for all trade relationships.
21Table 4: Robustness Results: Time Period and Product Aggregation
1970-2006 1980-2006 1990-2006 3-digit 2-digit 1-digit
Log distance 0:0609 0:0607 0:0493 0:0518 0:0635 0:0566
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Common language  0:1701  0:1813  0:1924  0:2080  0:2162  0:2030
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Colonial history  0:1241  0:1222  0:0991  0:1550  0:1864  0:2242
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Log GDP  0:2833  0:3360  0:4202  0:2989  0:2944  0:3507
(importer) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Log GDP  0:0179  0:0347  0:0672  0:0098  0:0273  0:0583
(exporter) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Exporter LDC  0:0900  0:0909  0:0875  0:0326  0:0062 0:0412
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.570) (0.057)
Log number of  0:2845  0:2906  0:2269  0:2373  0:1728  0:0279
export products (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.617)
Number of  0:0772  0:0679  0:0511  0:0944  0:0987  0:0951
export markets (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Lagged duration  0:0251  0:0328  0:0521  0:0205  0:0201  0:0209
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Log initial  0:0755  0:0763  0:0765  0:0545  0:0424  0:0281
import value (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Diﬀerentiated  0:1311  0:1516  0:1579
product (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Log total  0:0376  0:0415  0:0393  0:0236  0:0245  0:0400
import value (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
EU member  0:0436  0:0741  0:1387  0:0467  0:0575  0:0613
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
∆ log relative 0.0736 0.1143 0.1192 0:0481 0:0346 0:0627
real exchange rate (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
Duration dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
Year dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
Importer dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
Spell no. dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
 0.0856 0.1052 0.1147 0.0499 0.0467 0.0513
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Observations 1887638 1432718 895433 1268136 605949 154743
Spells 640848 531054 381658 364285 156911 32146
Trade relations 256058 236630 202567 130647 53545 10242
Log likelihood  813386  651646  444489  487889  220701  49362
Note: P-values in parentheses. In all cases, a probit model with random eﬀects on the exporter-product
level is estimated.  denotes the fraction of the error variance that is due to variation in the unobserved
individual factors. A trade relation is deﬁned as an importer-exporter-product combination. The number
of observations is given by the total number of years with positive trade for all trade relationships.
22coeﬃcient. Other changes mostly relate to a small number of variables losing their statis-
tical signiﬁcance: the LDC dummy becomes insigniﬁcant at the 1-digit and 2-digit level of
aggregation, and the total number of export products becomes insigniﬁcant when we use
1-digit trade data. The latter is not surprising, since there is very little variation among
the exporters in the number of exported products if product categories are that highly
aggregated.
To summarize, using alternative ways to deﬁne a spell, controlling for unobserved het-
erogeneity by means of ﬁxed rather than random eﬀects, progressively shortening the time
period under study, or aggregating the trade data, produces only marginal changes in the
results. Overall then, our results can be considered very robust, and in the few instances
where changes do occur, we generally obtain the beneﬁt of getting rid of some unexpected
results.
6 Summary and Conclusions
The objective of this paper is twofold. First, against the background of an existing empirical
literature on the duration of trade which has found that international trade is often of
strikingly short duration, we aim to establish whether or not EU imports from the rest of
the world are also short-lived. Second, since – as we and others argue – there is at this
point no clear, commonly accepted theoretical explanation for these short trade durations,
we seek to provide a thorough empirical description and analysis of the phenomenon, with
the intention of thereby facilitating theoretical developments on the subject.
We employ a rich data set of detailed imports by the EU15 countries from 140 exporters,
covering the extended time period 1962-2006. Using these data, we begin by conducting a
thorough descriptive analysis of the duration of EU imports, from which we draw several
conclusions. First, we ﬁnd that EU imports are indeed very short-lived – in fact possibly
more so than, for example, US imports. The median duration of EU imports is merely
one year. Moreover, almost 60 percent of all spells cease during the ﬁrst year of service,
while approximately 75 percent of all trade ﬂows terminate within the ﬁrst two years and
less than ten percent survive the ﬁrst ten years. The ﬁnding that EU imports are very
short-lived is upheld when we change the deﬁnition of a trade spell, use higher cut-oﬀ levels
for measuring trade and – remarkably – even when we aggregate trade ﬂows all the way
up to the 1-digit SITC level. Second, we ﬁnd that the duration of trade does not exhibit
any long-term upward or downward trend, but remains very stable across the extended
time period that we study. This is an interesting empirical ﬁnding as many of trade’s
other characteristics – such as volumes, number of traded products or number of trading
partners – have exhibited signiﬁcant changes over the same time period, as have many of
the factors that researchers suspect have an eﬀect on the duration of trade. Third, the
short trade durations which have been found in the literature are the result of at least two
23processes: on the one hand countries shifting between diﬀerent suppliers but continuing to
import a given product, and on the other hand countries ceasing to import the product
altogether. Fourth, short trade durations are empirically correlated with a lack of export
diversiﬁcation, both in terms of the number of other products the exporter ships and the
number of import markets it serves with the given product. No clear evidence is found to
connect the level of import diversiﬁcation to trade durations.
In addition to the descriptive analysis, we also perform a regression analysis. In this,
we follow the methodological results in Hess and Persson (2010) and avoid the problematic
continuous-time Cox models that have typically been employed in the literature. Instead,
we use discrete-time duration models which have been shown to be more appropriate,
while taking care to also control for many types of unobserved heterogeneity. The results
from our estimations suggest that distance increases the hazard that trade ﬂows die, while
a common language or a common colonial history reduces it. Importers with a large
GDP face signiﬁcantly lower hazards, as do exporters with a large GDP if we disregard
early data from the 1960s. Contrary to our expectations, least developed countries will,
everything else being equal, tend to have more long-lived export spells. Countries with
a diversiﬁed export structure – either in terms of exporting many products or trading
with many importing countries – will have lower hazards than countries which trade few
products and/or have few trading partners. If two countries have previously traded a
particular product for an extended period of time, this will lower the hazard of the current
trade ﬂow dying. If the trade ﬂow has a large initial value, if a diﬀerentiated product
is involved, or if the total EU market for the product is large, the hazard is decreased.
Countries that have already joined the EU will also face a lower risk of bilateral import
ﬂows dying. Lastly, just as one would expect, an appreciation of the exporter’s (relative)
real exchange rate increases the risk that the trade ﬂow will die.
24Appendix: Auxiliary Tables
Table A.1: Overview of Exporting Countries
Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Australia, Bahamas,
Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belize, Benin, Bermuda, Bhutan, Bolivia, Brazil,
Brunei, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada, Cape Verde,
Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Comoros, Congo (Dem. Rep.),
Congo (Rep.), Costa Rica, Côte d’Ivoire, Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican Republic,
Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Fiji,
French Polynesia, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Greenland, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea,
Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq,
Israel, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Hong Kong, Kenya, Kiribati, Korea (Rep.), Kuwait,
Lao PDR, Lebanon, Libya, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali,
Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, New Caledonia,
New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama,
Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Qatar, Rwanda, Samoa, San Marino,
São Tomé & Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore,
Somalia, Southern African Customs Union (Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, South Africa,
Swaziland), Sri Lanka, St. Kitts & Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent & the Grenadines,
Sudan, Suriname, Switzerland, Syria, Tanzania, Thailand, Togo, Tonga, Tunisia,
Trinidad and Tobago, Turkey, Uganda, United Arab Emirates, United States, Uruguay,
Vanuatu, Venezuela, Vietnam, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe
25Table A.2: Overview of Variables and Data Sources
Variable Deﬁnition & Data Source
Trade duration Length of trade spell in years. Constructed using 4-digit SITC
(Rev.1) EU15 imports from the United Nations’ Comtrade
(henceforth referred to as the UN Comtrade data).
Log distance Log of distance in km between the trading countries’ capitals.
Data from Centre d’études prospectives et d’informations (CEPII),
http://www.cepii.fr.
Common language Takes the value one if the trading countries share the same
language. Data from CEPII, http://www.cepii.fr.
Colonial history Takes the value one if the trading countries have a common
colonial history. Data from CEPII, http://www.cepii.fr.
Log GDP Log of importer’s or exporter’s GDP. Data from the World Bank’s
World Development Indicators (WDI) online.
Exporter LDC Takes the value one if the exporter is classiﬁed as a least developed
country by the UN at the end of the time period studied.
Log number of Log of the number of products shipped to any market by the
export products exporter for every year of the spell.
Constructed using the UN Comtrade data.
Number of Number of markets to which the exporter ships the given
export markets product for every year of the spell.
Constructed using the UN Comtrade data.
Lagged duration Number of years that a previous spell of the same trade
relationship lasted. Constructed using the UN Comtrade data.
Log initial Log of the value of imports at the beginning of the spell.
import value Constructed using the UN Comtrade data.
Diﬀerentiated Takes the value one if the product is classiﬁed as diﬀerentiated
product according to Rauch (1999).
Data from “Jon Haveman’s International Trade Data”,
http://www.macalester.edu/research/economics/
page/haveman/trade.resources/tradedata.html.
Concordance used to translate the Rauch classiﬁcation from
SITC (Rev.2) to SITC (Rev.1) from Feenstra (1997),
http://cid.econ.ucdavis.edu/usixd/wp5990d.html.
Log total Log of the total value of imports by all EU15 countries for the
import value given product and every year of the spell.
Constructed using the UN Comtrade data.
EU member Takes the value one if the importer is an EU member at the
respective duration of the spell.
∆ log relative Yearly diﬀerence in log relative real exchange rate, where the
real exchange rate relative real exchange rate is deﬁned as nominal exchange rate
(importer currency/exporter currency) adjusted by the respective
consumer price indices and normalized by the average real
exchange rate of all exporting countries against the importing
country. Bilateral real exchange rates have been constructed
using US exchange rates and national consumer price indices
from the World Bank’s WDI.
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